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482 PEOPLE tl. HENDERSON [60 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 7263. In Bank. Kov. 19, 1963.] 
TIlE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD 
KAYE HENDERSON, Defendant and Appellant. 
[la-1c] Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-In a 
murder prosecution, it WI1.S reversible error for the court to 
fail to instruct on its own motion on the legal si~nificallce of 
evidence of defendant's mental illness, not amounting to legal 
insanity, and to refuse to give defendant's proffered instruc-
tion on Illl1.nslaughter, where there was evidence sufficient to in-
form the court that defendant was relying on the defcn;;c of 
diminished responsibility, Ilnd the jury were not properly in-
structed on intent, the court informing them only that It partic-
ular intent was necessary and that to detenllinc such intent 
they were to look to the circumstances of the offense and 
defendant's sound mind, unless they found him to be an idiot, 
lunatic or legally insane, thus barring the jury from consider- I 
ing defendant's sole defense of diminished responsibility. 
[2) Id.-Insanity or Mental Condition: Evidence-State of Mind. 
-A plea of not guilty to a murder charge puts in issue the 
existence of the particular mental states that are essential 
elements of the two degrees of murder and of manslaughter, 
and defendant should be allowed to show that in fnct, sub-
jectively, he did not possess the mental state or states in issue. 
[3] Criminal Law-Instructions.-A court should instruct the jury 
on every material question on which there is any evidence de-
serving of any consideration. 
[4] Id.-Instructions.-That evidence may not be of a character 
to inspire belief does not authorize refusal of an instruction 
based on it; however incredible a defendant's testimony mny 
be he is entitled to an instruction based on the hypothesis that 
it is entirely true. 
[5] Id.-Mental Condition-Insanity.-The defense of mental ill-
ness not amounting to legal insanity is a significant issue in 
any case in which it is raised by substantial evidence; its 
purpose and effect are to ameliorate the law governing criminal 
responsibility prescribed by the M'Naughton rule. 
[6] Homicide-Insanity or Mental Condition: Instructions-
Mental Condition.-A defendant who was legally sane aeeord-
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 61 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal 
Law (1st ed § 32 et seq). 
McX. Dig References: [1] HOlllicide, ~ 267; [2] Homidd(', §§ 10, 
58; [3,4] Criminal Law, § iil·l: [ii] Crilllinni Law, § 26; [6] Homi-
cide, §§ 10, 197; [7] HOlllicicil', §~ 103, 104: [8] Criminal Law, 
§ 303(2); [9] Criminal Law, * 303; [10] Homicide, 118; [11] 
Criminal Law, § 522t1) j [12] Criminal Law, § 145. 
) 
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ing to the M'Xaughton test, but was suffering from a mental 
illness that prevented his acting with malice aforethought or 
with premeditation and deliberation, cannot be convicted of 
first degree murder; and where substantial evidence sullicient 
to inform the court that defendant is relying on the defense 
of diminished responsibility is received, the court must on its 
own Illotion instruct the jury as to the legal significance of such 
evidence. 
[7a, 7b] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-In a prosecution for 
murder in which the circumstances of the killing and the 
existence of fresh scratches on defendant's face when he was 
arrested indicated that the victim may have been killed during 
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate rape, it was not an 
abuse of discretion to admit testimony of a witness that de-
fendant had attacked her sexually a Ulonth before the killing 
under circulllstance:; similar to those under which the victim 
was killed, such evidence being admissible to prove defendant's 
motive for killing the victim and the intent with which the act 
was done. 
[8] Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Exeept when it 
shows merely criminal disposition, evidence that tends logical-
ly and by reasonable inference to establish nny fact material 
for the pro:;ecution, or to overcome any material fact sought 
to be proved by the defense, is admissible although it may 
connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge. 
[9] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Although evidence of prior 
offenses carries with it the risk that its probative value may 
be outweighed by it:; prejudicial effect, evaluation of this risk 
rests in the court's sound discretion. 
[lOa, lOb] Romicide-Evidence-Photographs.-In a prosecution 
for murder in which the circumstances of the killing and the 
existence of fresh scratches on defendant's face when he was 
arrested indicated that the victim may have been killed during 
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrnte rape, it was not an 
abuse of discretion to admit photographs of injuries inflicted 
on a witness by defendant during a sexual attack a month 
before the killing under cil'cumstances similar to those under 
which the victim was killed. 
[11] Criminal Law-Evldence-Photographs.-When allegedly in-
flammatory photographs are presented, the court must deter-
mine their admissibility ill light of their probative value, other 
evidence on the issue, and possible prejudice to defendant. 
[8] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed 
§ 316). 
[12] Conviction of lesser offense as bar to prosecution for 
gl'eatcr on new 11'ial, note, 61 A.IJ.R.2d 1141. See also Cal.Jur.2d, 
Criluillal Law, § 179 et seq. i Am.Jur., Criminal Law (1st ed § 38/l\ 
· ~) 
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[12] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Otfenses.-A defendant 
who appeals from an erroneous judgment convicting him of 
first dl'grce lllurder and sentencing him to life imprisonment 
and obtains a reversal and a retrial may not, after again be-
ing convicted of first degree murder, be sentenced to death; 
the double jeopardy provisions of the state Constitution (Cal. 
Const., art: I, § 13) apply to forbid a greater punishment for 
the same crime. (Overruling People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592 [91 
P. 515].) 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra 
Costa County. Wakefield Taylor, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction impos-
ing the death penalty, reversed. 
Benjamin Dreyfus, under appointment by thp. Supreme 
Court, and Garry, Dreyfus & McTernan for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and Albert 'V. Harris, 
Jr., Deputy .Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondcnt. 
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendant guilty of murder 
of the first degree and fixed the penalty at death. This appeal 
is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) In a previous I 
trial for the same offense defendant waived trial by jury and' 
pleaded guilty to murder, which the court found to bc of the: 
first degree. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment. ; 
On defendant's appeal the District Court of Appeal reversed' 
the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial pursu-
ant to a stipulation of defendant and counsel for dIe respec- , 
tive parties on the ground that defendant was improperly 
allowed to withdraw his pIca of not guilty and to enter a 
plea of guilty after the court had ordered defendant's coun-
sel discharged on defendant's motion. (Pen. Code, § 1018; 
People v. Ballentine, 39 Ca1.2d 193, 196 [246 P.2d 35].) 
Defendant admitted in open court that he killed the de-
ceased, Mrs. Joyce Lovett, in a motel in Pinole, and that he 
inflicted tIle lacerations and contusions found on her body. 
Defendant had previously been casually acquainted with 
the deceased and met her in a bar in San Jose on the evening 
of JUly 10, 1961. They had a few drinks and the deceased 
agreed to accompany defendant on a trip to Lake Tahoe. 
They left the bar about closing time and drove to a motel in 
EI Cerrito where defendant rcgistered them as ~Ir. and Mrs. 
) 
Nov. 1963] PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
{GO ('.~Il .... .;:!; :t ... f'aI.UI·tr. ":7, :1;;0 P.2d 67;J 
485 
R. Henderson. The following day they went to two Or threl' 
bars in EI Cerrito and San Pablo where each of thl'm drank 
!.oleveral beers. In the afternoon thl'Y started toward Sacra-
mento but were forced to stop in Pinole because defendant's 
automobile was overheatl'd. They ate and had several more 
beers in Pinoll', Defcndant inquired at a bar about motel 
accomodations. A customer drove them to a motel on the edge 
of town where defendant again registered them as Mr. and 
Mrs. Henderson. They arrived at the motel about 4 0 'clock in 
the afternoon. About half an hour later defendant killed and 
mutilated the deceased. At 10 o'clock that evening a motel 
elllployee gave defendant a ride downtown, and defendant 
drove his automobile back to the motel. Later that night he 
put the deceased's body in his car and after driving around 
for several hours put the body along the highway. Defendant 
then drove to his apartment in Santa Clara where he stayed 
the remaillderof the night. The following day he confessed 
the killing to his half-sister and showed her the deceased'sl 
rings. After seeing a lawyer in San Jose, he agreed to turn 
himself in and at about 8 p.m. surrendered to the Alamedal 
County Sheriff. 1 
The day after the killing Dr. McNie performed an autopsy! 
on the body of the deceased. He testified that death was: 
caused by asphyxiation from strangulation associated with: 
multiple blunt injuries. Dr. McNie found multiple contusions 
on deceased's head, neck, shoulders, arms, and legs. He 
found multiple small abrasions on the left breast, multiple 
scratches measuring up to two inches in length on the skin of 
the lower abdomen, a three-eights inch by one-quarter inch 
puncture of the skin over the pubis, and multiple wedge-
shaped lacerations of the skin and mucosa of the perineum 
radiating outward from the rectum and vagina, the largest of 
which was two by one inches extending from the vagina 
across the urethra to the clitoris. There was a three-quarter 
inch laceration of the rectovaginal septum. There were six to 
eight lacerations in the rectal area and the rectum was di-
lated to 2-1/2 inches in diameter and contained deceased's 
wadded panties. It was Dr. McNie's opinion, based on the 
finding of hemorrhage into the tissues underlying the inju-
ries, that, except for the perineal area, the injuries had been 
inflicted before death. Dr. McNie was not asked whether in 
his opinion the injuries to the perineal area occurred before 
or after dcath. He testified, however, that there ,vere areas of 
hemorrhage into the underlying supporting tissues of the 
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rectum and vagina and into the mucosa at the edges of the 
laceratiolls. Th('re ,,,as no cvidellce of spcrm in the vaginal 
tract. A. blood test disclosed .19 pcr cent alcohol in the 
dccC'ased's bloodstream at the time of death. 
Based on the condition of the body, the People requested 
and the trial court gave instructions defining murder of the 
first degree when committed by means of torture and when 
committ('d in the perpC'tr!1tiull or attl'liIpt to pC'rpetrate may-
hem. The evidence of defC'ndant's possession of the de-
ceased's rings, which the physical evidence suggested had 
been removed before death, and his possession of the de-
ceased's purse, support the instruction regarding a killing in 
the p('rpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. The cir-
cumstallces of the killing and the existence of fresh scratches 
on defendant's face when he was arrested support the in-
struction that the deceased may have been killed during the 
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate rape. 
The foregoing eyidence, together with cvidenee tending to 
rebut defendant's defense of lack of malicious intent and 
premeditation, was the basis for the People's theory that the 
killing was murder of the first degree because it was willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated. In this r('gard, the man who 
drove defendant and the deceased from the bar in Pinole to 
the motel testified that defendant did not appear to be intox-
icated at that time. The manager of the motel testified that 
whcn defendant registered "he had been drinking bnt he 
wasn't inebriated." Both of these witnesses were also of the 
opinion that the deceased was not intoxicated, although the 
blood test disclosed that l1er bloodstream contained .19 per 
cent alcohol. To negative lack of criminal intent the People 
also offered the testimony of Mrs. Pauline Perez that a month 
before the killing defendant had committed a sexual attack 
upon her under circumstances similar to those surrounding 
the homicide. 
Mrs. Perez testified that she met defendant in the same bar 
in San Jose in which he later met the deceased and agreed to 
have defendant take her home. She testified that defendant 
did not take her home and that when she attempted to get 
out of his car, he struck her and threatened to kill hcr if she 
tried it again. When they stopped, defendant drew a knife 
and attempted to rape her and forced her to commit an un-
natural act and to submit to the commission of a similar act 
by him. She testified that defendant then inserted a sap into 
her vagina and bit her arms, legs, breasts, and stomach. He 
Nov. 1963] PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
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threatened to kill her so that she could not report the inci-
dent to the police, but relented when she begged for her life. 
When defendant allowed her to leave the car, he kept her 
underclothes and purse. Mrs. Perez was taken to a hospital 
and the police were notified. Photog-mplis of Mrs. Perez's in-
juries wcre introduced by the People to explain and corrobo-
rate her testimony. Defendant admitted on the stand that he 
performed the acts testified to by Mrs. Perez, but denied that 
he had a knife or that he threatened to kill her. He also 
denied that he threatened to kill her because shc had in-
formed on him. 
Defendant does not contend that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support a conviction of first degree murder under 
any or all of the theories adyanced by the People. His de-
fense is that he had no intent to harm the deceased and that 
he had no control oyer his actions because of his intoxication i 
and mental illness not amounting to lcgal insanity. He testi-
fied that the mutilation of the deceased occurred after he had 
killed her by strangulation. He could not recall when or how 
he received the scratches on his face and denied that he at-
tempted to rape the deceased or to force her to engage in any 
unnatural act. He testified that he took the rings from her 
finger after he had put the body along the highway, but he 
did not know why he had taken them. He did not explain his 
possession of the deceased's purse. 
In support of his defense of intoxication, defendant testi-
fied that he drank 13 to 15 beers at various bars on the day of 
the killing and that he was drunk when he and the deceased 
arrived at the motel. He testified that after checking into the 
motel the deceased took a shower and as she was drying 
herself he walked into the bathroom, picked her up and car-
ried her into the bedroom. He "laid her down 011 the bed, 
and then ... started to make love to her and then this strange 
thing come" that he described as "like watching ... yourself 
do something and yet unable to intercede or to stop whatever 
is happening .... [Y] ou seem to be paralyzed and I could see 
everything was going on and, to put it bluntly, just like a 
dream." Defendant testified that he strangled the deceased 
with his hands but that before killing her he did not hit or 
cut her or do any other violence to her body. He testified that 
after he had killed her he"woke" or "came out" and 
realized what he had done. He carricd her body into thc 
shower and attempted to revive her with cold watcr. "And 
then I says, 'If she's as dead as she appears, who will believe 
) 
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mef' So that's when I got the crazy notion and did what the 
other I did." Defendant testified that he went into the bath-
room where the body was lying in a corner of the shower 
stall and cut the deceased's body with a beer can opener. 
Defendant then "passed out" on the bed. When he awoke, 
he dressed the body and left it leaning against the wall in the 
bathroom. About midnight he carried the body to his car and 
disposed of it along the highway. 
This version of the killing and mutilation was substan-
tially the same as that told to the various psychiatrists who 
testified at the trial. Defendant's half-sister, to whom d<,-
fendant confessed the crime before surrendering to the sher-
iff, testified that he told her that he "got a pain ... down 
here in the lower part, and it hurt, you know. Got a lot of 
pain and it made him black out like, and when he came to, he 
had a can opener in his hand and he went in [to the bath-
room] ... and he looked at her and he realized he strangled 
her and cut her up from the bottom part with the can opener 
to the belly button .... [A]nd then he told me how he did it. 
He said that he went into the bathroom and he says he don't 
remember doing it, but he knows he did it. He said that he 
went into the bathroom and strangled her and then he-he 
didn't remember how he cut her up. He just cut her up. 
That's all. And then when he woke up on the bed, the pain 
was gone away, he said. That he woke up and he found the 
can opener in his hand .... " 
Two psychiatrists testified that because of defendant's 
mental state he did not premeditate before the killing. Dr .. 
Wilcox's report, which was admitted into evid<'nee, stated 
that" I feel that this man is a borderline schizophrenic .... 
Despite the appearance of fairly good integration in most 
areas of the personality, there are many evidences of psychot-
ic thinking. It seems to me that the murder grew directly 
out of his illness. The murder appeared to be an expression 
of his hate for women and society; also his hate for himself .. 
. . I feel that Mr. Henderson is psychotic and that he also is 
legally insane. I feel that he was insane at the time of the 
murder." Although Dr. Wilcox was unsure whether defend-
ant could premeditate at the time of the killing, it was his 
opinion that defendant did not premeditate. Dr. Adams was 
of the opinion that at the time of the killing defendant was 
not capable of killing the deceased with premeditation. He 
testificd that in light of defendant's background he was 
suffering from a "severe psychologic problem ... not in a 
) 
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psychotic or insane sense, but rather in the sense of a flood of 
emotion which has a dynamic interpretation in the back-
ground, I am sure, connected somewhere with his mother, but 
in any event, leading to an emotional upheaval and always in 
a sexual setting over which he did not have voluntary con-
trol. Therefore, I say that at the time this happened, he was 
again, in my opinion, a victim of this flood of emotion to the 
extent that he was unable to utilize normal volitional control 
over his actions. ' , 
On cross-examination, both Dr. Wilcox and Dr. Adams 
stated that they based their opinions on what defendant had 
told them and that if the actual facts differed from defend-
ant's statement of them their opinions would be different. 
Dr. Wilcox stated that he would question his conclusion that 
defendant did not premcditate if the sequence of the killing 
and the mutilation were reversed, as the testimony of the 
autopsy surgeon suggested. In response to a hypothetical 
question he stated that defendant was able to premeditate 
during the Perez incident. 
In rebuttal, the People introduced the testimony of three 
psychiatrists who had examined defendant and concluded 
that he was not suffering from any mental defect that would 
preclude his acting with malice aforethought and premedita-
tion when he killed the deceased. Dr. Rapaport testifled that 
"at the time of this alleged offense, he was conscious and 
aware of what he was doing .... He had no mental illness ... 
that would have precluded him from forming intent or en- , 
gage in premeditation." Dr. Argens found "no evidence of ~ 
mental illness as such would preclude [defendant's] ... nor-
mal actions or ordinary actions .... [He found J no evidence 
at all of psychosis." Dr. Fort, who examined defendant on 
the day after the killing, testified that at the time of the 
homicide defendant "was conscious and ,vas not suffering 
from any form of mental illness or emotional disturbance 
that would have interfered with his capacity to premedi-
tate." 
[1a] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
failing on its own motion to instruct the jury on the le~al 
significance of the evidence of defendant's mental illness and 
in refusing to give defendant's proffered instruction on man-
slaughter. 
[2] "It would seem elementary that a plea of not guilty 
to a charge of murder puts in issue the existence of thc 
particular mental states which are essential elements of the 
) 
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two degrees of murder and of manslaughter .... Aeeordingly, 
it appears only fair and reasonable that defendant should be 
allowed to show that in faet, subjectively, he did Hot POSSl'SS 
the mental state or states in issue." (People v. Gorshell, 51 
Ca1.2d 716, 733 [336 P.2d 492] ; People v. lV ells, 33 Ca1.2d 
330, 343-357 [202 P.2d 53).) 
[3] " 'It is elementary that the court should instruct the 
jury upon every material question upon which there is allY 
evidence deserving of any consideration whatever . ... [4] 
The fact that the evidence may not be of a character to 
inspire belief docs not authorize the refusal of an illStl'llction 
based thereon .... Tltat is a question within the exclusive 
province of the jltry. However incredible the testimony of a 
defendant m,ay be he is entitled to an instruction based 11pon 
the hypothesis that it is entirely true.'" (People v. Carmen, 
36 Ca1.2d 768, 773 [228 P.2d 281].) 
[lb] The People do not disputc these settled propositions 
of law that under a general plea to the charge of murder, 
evidence is admissible tending to establish a defense negating 
the specific mental states essential to the crime and that ,,,hen 
such evidence is received, the defendant is entitled to an 
instruction apprising the jury of its significance. The People 
contend, however, that the trial court is not required to give 
such an instruction on its own motion. They argue that "The 
cases which have found a duty on the court to give sua 
sponte instructions have generally involved situations "'herc 
tIle failure to give the instructions had the C'i'fect of removing 
from the jury a significant issue in the trial and thus failing 
to give to the defendant an opportunity ... to obtain a. deter-
mination by the jury of the particular issue." 'Ve think that 
this is such a case. 
[5] It can no longer be doubted that the defense of men-
tal illness not amounting to legal insanity is a "signifiC'ant 
issue" in any ease in which it is raised by substantial evi-
dence. Its purpose and effect are to ameliorate the law ~ov­
ernillg criminal responsibility prescribed by the M 'Naughton 
rule. (See Lindman & McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and 
the Law (1961) 355-356.) under that rule a defendant is not 
insane in the eyes of the law if at the time of the crime he 
knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. [6] Fnder 
the ll' ells-Gorshcn rule of diminished r('!;ponsihili ty ('\,('n 
though a defendant be legally sane according to the M'-
Naughton test, if he was suffering from a mental illn('~s that 
prevented his acting with malice aforethought or with pre-
meditation and deliberation, he cannot be convicted of mur-
) 
,) 
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der of the first degree. This policy is now firmly establisllccl 
in the law of California (People v. Oorslten, supra; People v. 
Rah'r, 42 Ca1.2d 550, 569-571 [268 P.2d 705J; People v.San-
chez, 35 Ca1.2d 522, 526-529 [219 P.2d 9J; People v. Wells, 
supra; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684) and where, 
as here. substantial evidence sufficient to inform the court 
that !lefelldallt is relying upon th~ defense of diminisheJ re-
sponsibility is received, it must on its own motion instruct 
the jury as to the legal significance of such evidence, for 
such an instruction is "necessary for the jury to be fully and 
fairly cllarged upon the relevant law." (People v. Jackson, 
59 Cal.2d 375, 380 [2!) Cal.Rptr. 505, 379 P.2d 937], alld 
cases cited therein.) 
[1e] The People contend that the failure to instruct on 
diminished responsibility was not prejudicial because the ill-
tent and state of mind of defendant were fully deY(~loped by 
argument of counsel and were adequately covered by the 
instructions given. It is true that from the opening statement 
of counsel for the defense the issue of defendant's mental 
state at the time of the homicide was in issue. Defense coun-
sel stated that he expected the evidence would show "exactly 
what the District Attorney said, that this was a sadistic mur-
der." He added that he expected to prove from medical 
experts "that Mr. Henderson was suffering from SUCll a psy- I 
chosis or ... illness that he ... did not have tIle mind or the 
capability of forming a malicious or a prem('ditated [intent] 
.... " During his argument to the jury, the prosecutor re-
ferred to the psyclliatl'ic testimony and stated" this really is 
the defellse of the defendant here: his inability to premedi-
tat<', his lack of intent." In closing argument, defense COUll-
sel urged the jury to "examine carefully what the psychia-
trists have told you and what they have testified to, and I 
tllink ... that you will agl'ce with me that this was a heinous 
crime. I don't argue that .... [B] ut I say to you it wasn't 
premeditated." He argued "in closing ... the only issue in 
this case is the premeditation and the intent .... I do not 
excuse nor condone Mr. Henderson, but I say to you he is 
guilty of nothing greater than murder in the second de-
gree .... " 
We agree that in light of such extensive argument on the 
issue of defendant's responsibility he could not have been 
harmed by the failure to instruct on that issue if the jury 
was otherwise properly illstructed on intent. The jury, how-
ever, was not properly instructed on that issue. It ,vas in-
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structed that to constitute willful, deliberate, and premedita-
ted murder the killing must bc accompanied by a clear intent 
to take life resulting from deliberation and formed upon a 
preexisting reflection and not in heat of anger, and that the 
slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and 
the reasons for and against such choice and, having in mind 
the consequences, decide to and commit the unlawful act 
causing death. These instructions were proper, but they in--
formed the jury only that a particular intent was necessary. 
How the jury should discover whether that intent existed 
was covered by the following instruction: "The intent or 
intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with 
the offense and the sound mind and discretion of the aceused, 
and I further instruct you that all persons are of sound mind 
who are neither idiots nor lunatics nor affected with insanity 
to such an extent as to be unable to discern right from 
wrong." 
Although counsel argued and the court instructed that de-
fendant's intent was the crucial issue in the case, the only 
instruction that purported to tell the jury how to determine 
what that intent was told them to look to the circumstances 
of the offense and defendant's ,. sound mind" unless they 
found him to be an idiot, lunatic or legally insane. 
"The prejudicial nature of the instruction appears most 
clearly in the difficulties that it creates for the jury in the 
application of the rule ... that evidence of a mental infirm-
ity, not amounting to legal insanity, is admissible and should 
be considered by the jury on the questions of premeditation 
and deliberation. If the defendant has a 'sound mind,' that 
is 'a healthy and robust mind, neither diseased nor injured,' 
it necessarily follows that he would not have a mental infirm-
ity making him incapable of premeditating or deliberating." 
(People v. Baker, 42 Ca1.2d 550,569 (268 P.2d 705].) 
Defendant admitted that he killed and mutilated the de-
ceased. These were the major "circumstances connected with 
the offense" from which the jury was instructed it could 
infer defendant's intent. His sole defense was diminished 
responsibility because of his "unsound" though not insane 
mind, and this defense was withdrawn from the jury by the 
court's instruction that defendant was of sound mind if he 
was not all idiot, lunatic or legally insane. There could be no 
question of defendant's legal insanity during the trial of his 
guilt or innocence since that issue was to be determined on 
the separate proceeding under his plea of not guilty by rea-
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son of insanity, which was not withdrawn until the conclu-
sion of the trial on the issue of guilt. Under these circum-
stances, defendant is "conclusively presumed to have been 
sane at the time the offense is alleged to have been commit· 
ted." (Pen. Code, § 1026.) There was no evidence that de-
fendant was a lunatic or an idiot within the ordinary mean-
ing of those words. Based on the only criteria it was given, 
the jury could only have found that defendant was of 
"sound mind." The effect of the instruction that defendant 
was of sound mind together with the failure to instruct on 
the significance of his defense of diminished responsibility 
was to withdraw from the jury all consideration of the evi-
dence introduced in support of that defense. Such evidence, 
although disputed, was considerable. There was no evidence 
that defendant intended to kill the deceased at any time 
before rcgistering at the motel, and the autopsy surgeon's 
report and defendant's testimony agree that death occurred 
shortly thereafter. That defendant theretofore had no pre-' 
meditated intent to kill is attested to by the prosecution wit-. 
nesses who testified as to the conduct of defendant and the 1 
deceased at every point between their meeting in San Jose 
and the motel in Pinole. Although the half hour that elapsed 
between the registering and the killing was sufficient for de-
fendant to form a willful, deliberate, and premeditated in-
tent to kill, the evidence does not compel that conclusion. 
Although the circumstances of the killing and the condition 
of the deceased's body would warrant a conclusion that the 
killing was premeditated, they also suggest that the perpetra-
tor of such a killing and mutilation was deranged. Defendant 
testified that he had no intention to kill the deceased and· 
that the act was done while he was in a dream-like state. Two 
psychiatrists testified in corroboration of this explanation of 
the killing. We do not overlook the testimony of the autopsy 
surgeon that the mutilation occurred before the killing, and 
we are aware of the damaging effect of this testimony, if 
true, upon defendant's defense. That testimony, however, is 
not without equivocation. Dr. McNie consistently responded 
to questions regarding the relationship of the wounds to 
death by stating that he "felt" that thcy were inflicted 
before death. The jury was instructed that it could disregard 
or give such weight as it thought warranted to expert testi-
mony. Accordingly, it was entitled to disregard an expert's 
"fecling" concerning evidence within his competcnce to in-
terpret. It follows that the jury could have concluded that 
) 
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defendant was telling the truth about the sequence of events 
aud his intent at the time they occurred. It could have con-
cluded that defendant's experts were not discredited on. the 
g'l'olmd that their opinions were based on an erroncous view 
of the circumstances. If the jury so concluded, it could not 
have found defendant guilty of murder in the commission of 
mayhem or by torture. The evidence that defendant killed 
during the course of rape or an attempt to rape was wholly 
circumstantial and inconsistent with the evidence that de-
ceased willingly accompanied defendant to the motel and wil-
lingly engaged in sexual intercourse with him during their 
stay in the first motel. Although defendant had deceased's 
rings and purse in his possession after the killing, tllat was 
the only evidence that the deceased was killed during the 
course of a robbery. There is no evidcnce tllat if an intent to 
take her property existed, it arose before the completion of 
the homicide. The vice of the instruction is that even if the 
jury found no murder by torture or killing during the course 
of mayhem, rape, or robbery, it was barred fro111 considering 
defendant's sole defense of diminished responsibility by the 
court's direction that defendant was of "sound mind." The 
error was aggravated by the court's failure to give any in-
struction that told the jury for what purpose they could 
consider the evidenee of that defense. 
Since defendant was deprived of the right to a jury deter-
mination of the only real issue in the case, the cOllviction 
must be reversed, for the denial of such a right itself is a 
miscarriage of justice within the meaning of article VI, sec-
tion 41;2, of the Constitution. (People v. JIcI(ay, 37 Ca1.2d . 
792, 798 [236 P.2d 145] ; People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Ca1.2d 7; 
11 [161 P.2d 934] ; People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 627 [258 
P.607].) 
Since the judgment must be reversed, we shall consider 
other contentions that may arise on retrial. 
[7a] Defendant's contention that the trial court erred in 
admitting into evidence over objection the testimony of Mrs. 
Pauline Perez that defendant had attacked ller sexually a 
month before the killing is devoid of merit. It was clearly 
admissible to prove, as the jury was instructed, dcfpndant's 
motive for killing the deceased and the intent with which the 
act was done. [8] "It is settled in this state that except 
when it shows merely criminal disposition, evidence which 
tends logically and by reasonable inference to establish any 
fact material for the prosecution, or to overcome any material 
) 
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fact sought to be pro .... ed by the defense, is admissible al-
though it may connect the accused with an offense not in-
cluded in the charge." (People Y. Woods, 35 Ca1.2d 504, 50!) 
[218 P.2d 981]; People Y. Weitz, 42 Ca1.2d 338, 347 [267 
P.2d 295].) The evidence was relevant on the issues for 
which it was received. [9] Although evidence of prior offen-
ses carries with it the risk that its probative value may be 
()utwcig-hed by its pos-.;iule prcjmlicial effect, evaluation of 
this risk rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. 
(People v. McCaughan, 49 Ca1.2d 409, 421-422 [317 P.2rl 
974].) [7b] We find no abuse of discretion in the admis-
sion of Mrs. Perez's testilllony. 
[lOa] Defendant also eontencls that the trial court erred 
in adlllitting photographs of Mrs. Perez's injuries, on tl](' 
ground that they served solely to inflallle the jury. [11] 
When allegedly inflammatory photographs are presented, the 
trial court must determine their admissiblity in light of their 
probative value, other evidence on the issue, and their possi-
ble prejudice to the defendant. (People v. Love, 53 Ca1.2d 
843, 852 [3 Cal.Rptr. 6G5, 350 P.2d 705] ; People v. Atchley, 
53 Ca1.2d 160, 168 [34G P.2d 764]; People v. Brubaker, 53 
Ca1.2d 37, 48 [346 P.2d 8].) [lOb] We find no abuse of' 
discretion in the adlllission of the photographs. 
[12] Defendant contl'llds that the prohibition against 
double jeopardy precludes imposing the death sentence after 
reversal of the first judgment sentt'l1cing him to life impri-
sonment. Article I, section 13, of the California Constitution 
provides that" No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense .... " It states a fundamental principle lim-
iting the state's right repeatedly to prosecute a defendant. It 
is not an absolute prohibition, for although jeopardy may 
have attached, legal necessity or the real or implied consent 
of the defendant permits a retrial. (Paulson v. Superior 
Court, 58 Ca1.2d 1, 5 [22 Cal.Hptr. 64!J, 372 P.2d 641], and 
cases cited.) III the present case, we must determine the ex-
tent to which a defelldallt \\"ho attacks un errolleous conviction 
thereby opens the door to beillg again placed in jeopardy. 
He does not gain immunity, for by successfully attacking 
the judgment he at least subjects himself to a retrial that 
may reach the same rt'sult. (United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 
662, 672 [16 S.Ct. 1 H12, 41 L.Ed. 3OD, 303] ; People v. Green, 
47 Ca1.2d 209, 23~ [:302 P.2d 3071.) There is a sharp conflict 
in the cases, howevcr. whether suell an attack opens the door 








496 PEOPLE v. HENDERSON [60 C.2d 
cases collected in 61 A.L.R.2d 1141-1216.) The question usu-
ally al'ises when a defendant has successfully attacked a con-
viction of a lesser included offense or a cOllviction of a lower 
degree of the crime chargcd. 
Before this court's decision in Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 
Cal.2d 640 [328 P.2d 976], there was a curious distinction 
betwe<.'n a conviction of a lesser included offense and a con-
viction of a lesser degree of a crime divided into degrees. 
A conviction of a lesser included offense was deemed a final 
acquittal of the offense charged, which was not affected by a 
subsequent reversal of the conviction. (In re Hess, 45 Ca1.2<l 
171, 176 [288 P.2d 5], and cases cited.) A conviction of the 
lesser degree of a crime divided into degrees was not deemcd 
an acquittal of guilt of the higher degree, and after reversal 
the defendant could be convicted of the higher degree on 
retrial. (People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 235 [3 P. 818] ; People 
v. McNcer, 14 Cal.App.2d 22, 30 [57 P.2d 1018].) In the 
Gomez case, however, we found this distinction to bc logically 
indefensible and held that the double jeopardy clause pre-
cluded convicting a defendant of a higher degree of a crime 
after he had secured reversal of his conviction of the lower 
degree. In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 [78 S.Ot. 221, 
2 L.Ed.2d 199, 61. A.L.R.2d 1119], the United States Su-
preme Court reached the same conclusion with regard to a 
conviction of first degree murder after reversal of a convic-
tion of second degree murder. In holding that a defendant is 
not required to elect between suffering an erroneous convic-
tion to stand unchallenged and appealing therefrom at the 
cost of forfeiting a valid defense to the greater offensc, we 
agreed with the reasoning in the Green case, that '" a 
defendant faced with such a "choice" takes a "desperate 
chance" in securing the reversal of the erroneous conviction. 
The law should not, and in our judgment does not, place the 
defendant in such an incredible dilemma.''' (Gomez v. 
Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 640, 651-652 [328 P.2d 976].) This 
reasoning applies with equal force to the present case. 
The A ttorney General contends, however, that under the 
double jeopardy clause in the United States Constitution and 
the California Constitution the death penalty can be imposed 
on a conviction of firf>t degree murder following reversal of a 
convictioll for the same offense with punishment fixed at life 
imprif>ollment. (Stroud v. United Stutes, 251 U.S. 15, 18 [40 
S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 103, 110] ; People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 
598 [91 P. 515] ; see also, State v. Knccskern, 303 Iowa 929 
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[210 N.W. 465, 473] ; Stafe v. Morgan, 145 La. 585 [82 So. 
711, 719] ; Mann v. State, 23 Fla. 610 [3 So. 207, 211] ; Greer 
v. State, 62 Tenn. (3 Baxt.) 321, 323-325.) When Stroud v. 
United States and People v. Grill were decided, it had been 
held by the United States Supreme Court and by this court 
that a reversed conviction of a lesser degree of a crime did 
not preclude conviction of the higher degree on retrial. 
(Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533-534 [26 S.Ct. 121, 
50 h.Ed. 292, 296-297] ; People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 235 [3 
P. 818].) A fortiori that rule would apply to different pun-
ishments for the same crime. Since the Green and Gomez 
cases have now cstablished that a reversed conviction of a 
lesser degree of a crime precludes conviction of a higher de-
gree on retrial, the rationale of the Stroud and Grill cases has 
been vitiated. It is immaterial to the basic purpose of the 
constitutional provision against double jeopardy whether the 
Legislature divides a crime into different degrees carrying 
different punishments or allows the court or jury to fix 
different punishments for the same crime. Thus, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter dissented in the Green case arguing that the 
Court's decision in Stroud v. United States, supra, con-
trolled the decision: ".\s a practical matter, and on any basis 
of human values, it is scarcely possible to distinguish a case 
in which the defendant is convicted of a greater offense from 
the one in which he is convicted of an offense that has the 
same name as that of which he was previously convieted but 
carries a significantly different pUllishment, namely death 
rather than imprisonment." (355 U.S. 184, 198 at p. 213 [2 
L.Ed.2d 199, 210 at p. 219, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119, 1130 at p. 1138 J.) 
Agrceing with ~lr. Justice Frankfurter's reasoning, we over-
rule People v. Grill, 151 Cal.592 [91 P. 515]. A defendant's 
right of appeal from an erroneous judgment is unreasonably 
impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke that 
right. Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous 
judgmellts, it has no interest in foreclosing appeals there. 
from by imposing nnreasonable conditions on the right to 
appeal. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., con-
curred. 
SCHACER, J.-Jn dissellting J stress above all other con· 
siderations, however seriuus they are, my objections to the 
.J 
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majority's hohlill:£ ~(/lIfr, pp. -l:);) - -lui) that the prohibition 
again:;t double jeoparuy (Cal. COllst., art. I, § 13; Pen. Coue, 
§§ 687, 1023) forbids tile trier of fact to impose a death 
sentence on a defendallt cOll\'icted on retrial of first degree 
murder after reversal on appeaP of a judgment sentencing 
him to life imprisonment for the same offense, following his 
previous waiver of jury trial and plea of guilty. The rcc~ r<l 
of the second trial is replete with evidence, material to both 
guilt and penalty, which II ad not been adduced at the first 
proceeding because of such waiver and plea. 
The subject majority ruling is wholly without support ill 
the decisions of this or any other court, and indeed is direct-
ly contrary to the llOldings of the United States Supreme 
Court (Stroud v. United States (1919) 251 U.S. 15, 18 [40 
S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 103, 110]; see also Murphy v. Massachu- ! 
setts (1900) 177 U.S. 155 [20 S.Ct. 639, 44 L.Ed. 711]) and: 
of every state court (including the Supreme Court of Cali- : 
fornia) that has had occasion to rule on the matter (People i 
v. Grill (1907) 151 Cal. 592, 598 [91 P. 515] ; State v. Knce-
skern (1926) 303 Iowa 929 [210 N.W. 465] ; State v. Morgan 
(1!Jl9) 14;) La. 58.3 [82 So. 711] ; Jiann v. State (1887) 23 
PIa. 610 [3 So. 207J; Greer v. State (1874) 62 Tenn. (:3 
Buxt.) 321). ~\s will hereinafter be shown, the latter hohl-
jll~s remain good law and have not been "vitiated" (as the 
majority argue) by subsequent decision on essentially dis-
tinguishable issues. 
'flll're is no doubt, as the majority acknowledge (ante, p. 
4!l;», that after rewrsal on appeal the prollibition against· 
double jeopardy does not prevent a retrial whereby the 
defendant can legally be cOllvicted of the same offense as that 
of which he ,vas originally found guilty. Penal Code seetioll 
1180 specifics that "The granting of a new trial places t!,(, 
parties in the same position as if no trial had been had. All 
thE' testimony must be produced anew, and the former verdict 
or finding cannot be used or referred to, either in evidence or 
ill argument, or be pleaded in bar of any conviction which 
might have been had under the accusatory pleading." Thl!!; 
there will be a retrial in the case at bench (§ 1262), and 
upon such trial defendant can again be convicted of mnrdl'r 
in the first degree. (United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U.S. 
1 Here the re"ersal was by stipulation of the parties, signed by the 
defl'n<iant, uy his nttortlcy, and hy the Attorney General. The 11JIUSII:11 
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662, 672 [16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300].) If he sllOuld be so 
convicted, it would be thc statutory duty of the trial court to 
comply with Penal Code section 190, which prescribes that 
,. Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall 
suffer death, or confinement in the state prison for life, at the 
discretion of the court or jury trying the same, and the mat-
ter of punishment shall be determined as provided in scction 
190.1 . ... " (Italics addC'd.) The latter section declares ill 
relevant part that "If such person has been found guilty of 
an offense punisllable by life imprisonment or death, .•. there 
shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penal-
ty, and the trier of fact shall fix the penalty .... The deter-
mination of the penalty of life imprisonment or death shall 
be in the discretion of the court or jury trying the issue of 
fact on the evidence presented .... " But under the present 
ruling of the majority the trier of fact will actually have no 
discretion in such proceedings other than to fix tIle punish-
ment at life imprisonment. Indeed, even if wholly different 
evidence were to be introduced on the retrial of the penalty 
issue,!! the trier of fact cOllld give no cffect to sllch cl'idence 
but would be mechanically bound by thc finding made on other 
evidence and by a different trier of fact in the first proceeding. 
The subject holding thus amounts to a judicial aborgation of I 
the releyant portions of Penal Code sections 190 and 190.1: In I 
cases such as the one before us it will be futile to comply . 
with the statutory command that "there shall thereupon be ; 
further proceedings on the issue of penalty," as the deter-
mination of that issue will no longer "be in the discretion of 
the court or jury trying the issue of fact on the evidence·' 
presented" (Pen. Code, § 190.1). 
Analysis discloses only two arguments that can conceivably 
be advanced in support of today's majority holding on dou-
ble jeopardy: i.e., either (1) the prohibition against double 
jeopardy applies because in the first penalty trialS the trier 
of fact impliedly II acquitted" defendant of that "degree" 
of first degree murder that warrants the death penalty, by 
!!Ucre, ns hns bcen already mentioned, the record on the retrial-the 
only trial where guilt was at issue-is replete with evidence, material to 
both guilt and penalty, whieh had not bcen audnceJ at the first procced· 
ing because of defendant's waiver of jury trial and plea of guilty. 
sIt ean only be on tbe first penalty trial thnt the majority hold 
defendant was .. acquitted" of the type of first degree murder that 
warrants the death penalty, because defenuant pleaded guilty to the 
charge aa laid. 
) 
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finding him "guilty" of another "degree" of first degree 
murder that warrants only life imprisonment; or (2) the 
prohibition against double jeopardy relates not only to the 
offense of which the defendant was "acquitted" but also the 
.' punishment imposed for the offense of which he was convic-
: ted (and for which he can be retried). Each of these argu-
ments, as will be shown in turn, is an absurdity. 
The first argument has nowhere been better stated than by 
this court in People v. Grill (1907) supra, 151 Cal. 592, 598: 
"It is now claimed that where there is a charge of murder of 
the first degree and a conviction of murder of the first degree 
with the penalty of imprisonment for life such judgment is a 
virtual acquittal of the character of murder sufficiently atro-
cious to justify the death penalty and is a bar to the inflic-
tion of the death penalty upon a retrial of the same charge." 
The argument thus assumes that there are two "degrees" or 
grades of first degree murder, one being "sufficiently atro-
cious to justify the death penalty" and the other being, 
presumably, not "sufficiently atrocious." A complete refuta-
tion of this argument and its assumption is set forth in Grill 
(ibid.), as follows: "The discretion given to the jury to miti-
gate the punishment upon a conviction of murder in the first 
degree, and inflict imprisonment for life only, does not, after 
such a verdict, divide that degree of murder into two degrees, 
but merely reduces the punishment. The mere substitution of 
imprisonment for life for the death penalty is not a deter-
mination that any element of murder of the first degree is 
lacking. On the contrary, such a verdict eannot be given until 
all the facts necessary to constitute that degree of murder are 
established. The former conviction was not an acquittal of 
the first degree of murder nor of any degree thereof." 
(Italics added.) Likewise, the United States Supreme Court 
observed in Stroud v. United States (1919) supra, 251 U.S. 
15, 18 [40 S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 103, 110], that" The fact that 
the jury may thus mitigate the punishment to imprisonment 
for life did not render the conviction less than one for first 
degree murder. " 
The majority seek to circumvent the holdings of Stroud 
and Grill by asserting (ante, p. 497) that "Since the Green 
[Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184 (78 S. Ct. 221, 
2 L.Ed.2d 199, 61 A.L.R.2d 119)] and Gomez [Gomez v. 
Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 640 (328 P.2d 976)] cases 
have now established that a reversed conviction of a lesser 
degree of a crime precludes conviction of a higher de-
) 
) 
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gree on retrial, the rationale of the Stroud and Grill cases 
has been vitiated." (Italics addl'd.) That tlle emphasized 
language is a total 11011 sequitur appears from the face of the 
opinions themselves. Both Green and Gomez dealt with the 
problem of whether the prohibition against double jeopardy 
precludes retrial for a higher degree of an offense after re-
versal of a conviction of a lower degree. In the case at bench, 
by contrast, defendant has been convicted of only one offense, 
first degree murder; as just explained, the jury's determina-
tion of penalty (or the court's determination as in the first 
trial here) does not divide first degree murder into two fur-
ther IC degrees" or grades. 
It is true that in Grill (at p. 598 of 151 Cal.) this court 
adverted in passing to the fact that (as of that date) "It has 
been held that a conviction of murder of the sccond degree 
upon the trial of a charge of murder of the first degree is no 
bar to a subsequent conviction of the higher degree upon a 
retrial of the same case granted upon defendant's motion," 
citing inter alia People v. Keefer (1884) 65 Cal. 232, 235 [3 
P. 818]. But the court then observed, "Upon this exact point 
we need express no opinion," and immediately went on to 
dispose of the issue of double jeopardy on the unrelated but 
wholly adequate rationale quoted hereinabove. The Keefer 
rule was abandoned in Gomez; but since that rule was unnec-
essary to the decision in Grill-and reliance thereon was ex-
pressly disavowed in the above quoted language of the Grill 
opinion-it is manifest that Gomez neither overruled Grill by 
implication nor in any way "vitiated" its true rationale. 
Similarly, it is manifest that the rationale of Stroud was· 
not "vitiated" by the decision in Green. While the Green 
case cast doubt upon Trona v. United States (1905) 199 U.S. 
521 [26 S.Ct. 121, 50 L.Ec. 292], cited in Stroud, the court 
in Green nevertheless took pains to declare (at p. 195, fn. 15, 
of 355 U.S. [2 L.Ed.2d at p. 208, 61 A.L.R.2d at p. 1128] : 
"Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 [40 S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 
103], is clearly distinguisllable. In that case [as in the case at 
bench] a defendant was retried for first degree murder after 
he had successfully asked an appellate court to set aside a 
prior conviction for that same offense." It appears to me 
somewhat presumptuous for the majority of this court to 
assert that Stroud was "vitiated" by Green when the 
United States Supreme Court itself states in the latter deci-
) 
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sion that Stroud" is cleady distinguishable.' 'f 
This brings me to the second possible argument in support 
of the majority's holding-i.e., that the prohibition against 
double jeopardy relates also to the punishmcnt imposed for 
the offense of which the defendant was convicted (and for 
which, after reversal on appeal, he can be retried). Ignoring 
the lines drawn by the high court in G"cen, the majority 
further assert (ante, p. 497) that" It is immaterial to the 
basic purpose of the constitutional provision against double 
jeopardy whether the Legislature divides a crime into differ-
ent degrees carrying different punishments or allows the 
court or jury to fix different punishments for the same 
crime." No authority is cited for this sweeping statement, 
nor can any be found. It represents a misreading or disre-
gard of both Green and Gomcz, which stand for the basic 
proposition that under the law of double jeopardy a defend-
ant cannot be said to have waived his implied acquittal on 
one offense in order to exercise his right to appeal from his 
conviction on another offense, regardlcss of 1vhether the di.~­
tinction bctwcen the offenses as set forth in the penal statutes 
is expressed by means of different names (e.g., manslaughter 
and murder) or by means of different degrees of a crime 
bearing one name (e.g., first degree murder and second de-
gree murder). The fallacy inherent in the majority's attemp-
ted analogy is simple. It overlooks the fundamental prin-
ciple that even though different degrf'es of a crime may refer 
to a common name (e.g., murder), each of those clcgrecs -is in 
fact a different offense, requiring proof of different elements 
for conviction. This truth ,vas well grasped by the court in 
. fIt is also a quite novel claim of precedent for the majority to 
"agree with" :MI". Justi('e Frankfurter's afl;ulllC'llt on this point (ante, 
p. 49i) while at the same time rejecting in effect the entire substance of 
his dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by three other membel's of 
the high eourt (355 U.S. at pp. 198·219 [2 L.Ed.2d at pp. 210·222, 61 
A.L.R.:!d at p. 1128]). It is noteworthy, for example, tllat tile majority 
do not choose to quote tile following passage from Justice Frankfurter's 
opinion: "\Yc should not be so unmindful, even when constitutional 
questions are involved, of the principle of stare decisis, by whose cir-
cumspect observance the wisdolll of this Court as an institution trans-
('ending the moment can alone be brought to bear on the difiicult prob-
lems that confront us ... , l W]e are not here called upon to weigh 
considerations generated by changing concepts as to minimum standards 
of fairness, which interpretation of the Due Process Clause inevitably 
requires. Instead, tile defense of double jeopardy is involved, whose 
("ontollrs arc the PI'Otillct. of history." (3.',j U.S. at p. 215 [2 L.Ed.2d at 
p. 220, 61 A.L.R.2d at pp. 1138, 1139].) 
) 
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Gomez (at p. 645 [2] of 50 Ca1.2d), where it was statl'u that 
"The elements necessary for first degree murder differ from 
those of second degree murder .... A jury implil'dly ul'citL's 
that the necessary element of the greater crime i!'l lacking 
under the evidence and returns a verdict fin(ling the defend-
ant guilty of the lesser degree." And given the fact that 1 
different degrees constitute different offenses, it is not supris- i 
ing that they carry different punishments. The majority's 
emphasis on such difference in punishments is, therefore,' 
both misleading and without substance. 
Moreover, contrary to the majority's assertion, the author-
ities demonstrate that the distinction between degrees of 
crime and difference in punishment is not "immaterial to the 
basic purpose of the constitutional provision against doubl(' 
jeopardy!' Although the majority do not rl'state that "bas',· 
purpose," I assume it to be as set forth ill Gomez (at p. G-J·l 
{2] of 50 Ca1.2d, quoting from Green v. United States (l!J::i7) 
sltpra, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 [78 S.Ot. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 
204, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119, 1124]): "The underlying idea, one 
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-A mericall 
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resour-
ces and power should not be allowed to make repeated 
attempts to convict an individuaZ for an alhoed ofJrnse. 
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal 
and compelling him to live in a continuing statf! of anxiet~· 
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even 
though innocent he may be found guilty." (Italics auded.) 
The limitation of the protection to repeated trials for "the 
same offense" is not accidental; it is obedient to the expres>i 
language of the constitutional and statutory mandates. Tlms 
the Fifth Amendment to the Uniteu States Constitution de-
clares that "No perSOll shall ... be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put ill jeopardy of life or limb." Article 
I, section 13, of the California Constitution likewise provides 
that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the sa'me 
offense." And the Penal Codc sections which restate and 
implement the constitutional command (§ § 687, 1023) arc 
also phrased in terms of jeopardy for the Mille "offrllse." 
(See also Pen. Codr, §§ !Ja9. 102~, 1887.) 
Under the forpgoing provisions this court has ronsistently 
held that the prohibition agaillst double jpopardy dors 110t 
apply to the issne of puni.shmcllt. Thus ill reYl'r:;in;! a jndg. 
ment of denth illsofal' as it rplllt('(l to the question of IWllalt.,· 
we held (['cople v. Green (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 209, 235 [11J 
) 
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[302 P.2d 307] tIl at "Inasmuch as the original sentence is 
set asidc at tllC behest of the defendant it cannot be success-
fully pleaded as constituting former jcopardy and there is no 
denial of due process. [Citations.]" (Accord, People v. 
Hooton (1959) 53 CaI.2d 85, 88 [3]-89 [4] [346 P.2d 199].) 
As the United States Supreme Court declared in the leading 
case of United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U.S. 662, 669 [16 
S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 3001 (cited in the majority opinion 
ante, at p. 4(5) : "The prohibition is not against being twice 
punished, II but against being twice put in jeopardy; ... " 
That same court has held, more particularly, that a defend-
ant is not twice put in jeopardy when, after reversal of his 
sentence on an appeal taken by him, his punishment is in-
creased for the same offense. (Murphy v. Massachusetts 
(1900) 177 U.S. 155 [20 S.Ct. 639, 44 L.Ed. 711] [affirming 
judgment which increased defendant's minimum sentence, 
after appeal, from 10 Yl'ars to 12% years imprisonment].) 
Lest it be thought that Green v. United States (1957) I 
supra, 355 U.S. 184 [78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 61 A.L.R.2d I 
1119], has necessarily "vitiated" the holding in Murphy as 
well, it is appropriate to consider two recent decisions of 
distinguished state courts on this issue, each postdating 
Green by some five years. In Hicks v. Commonwealth (1962) 
(Mass.) 185 N.E.2d 739, the defendant pleaded guilty to 
four indictments of armed robbery and was sentenced to con-
current terms of 15 to 20 years imprisonment on each indiGt-
ment. The defendant appealed, exercising his statutory right 
to a review of the sentences (Mass. Gen. Laws, eh. 278, 
§§ 28A-28D). The Appellate Division, after hearing, ordered 
the defendant's sentences increased to concurrent terms of 
20 to 25 years imprisonment. The defendant then appealed to 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, arguing that 
"the increase of the sentences placed him in jeopardy for the 
second time" in contravention of the constitutional guaran-
tees. The court rejected this contention, reasoning that "It 
has been held repeatedly by this court and by the Supreme 
Court of the United States that a defendant can be tried a 
second time for an offence when his prior conviction for that 
offence has been set aside on his appeal. [Citations.] Hao the 
IIIt may be noted t11at in California a statute, not hn'p,] on the 
constitutional mandate against double jeopardy. indepelln~ntly pro· 
scrihes douhle punishment for the snme "net or omission." (P,·n. ('odp, 
§ 1i54; People v. Ti,lcman (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 574, 578 [2] [!!1 Cal.Rptr. 
207,370 P.2d lOOj).) 
.. J 
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[defendant] been convicted and sentenced and if on his ap-
peal the conviction had been reversed, a subsequent convic-
tion followed by a longer sentence than the one initially im-
posed would not be objectionable." (185 N.E.2d at p. 740 [1-
2].) On all fours with Hicks is Kohl/uss v. Warden of Con-
necticut State Prison (1962) 149 Conn. 692 [183 A.2d 626], 
in which the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held 
that a defendant had not been subjected to double jeopardy 
when the minimum term of imprisonment specified in his 
sentence was ordered increased in a review thereof sought by 
him. The court in its opinion relied on Stroud v. United 
States (1919) supra, 251 U.S. 15 [40 S.Ct. 50, 6{ T,.Ed. 1031. 
and Murphy v. Massachusetts (1900) sttpra, 177 U.S. 155 
[20 S.Ct. 639, 44 L.Ed. 711], and dismissed Green v. United 
States (1957) supra, 355 U.S. 184 [78 S.Ot. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 
199, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119], as being "clearly distinguishable 
from the case at bar," (183 A.2d at p. 628 [4].) It is es-
tablished in California by both statutes and decisional law 
that "The prosecution ... commences when the indictment, 
or information is filed in the superior court and normally 
continues until ... the accused is 'brought to trial and pun-
ishment' or is acquitted." (People v. Tideman (1962) supra, 
57 Ca1.2d 574, 579 [5]; Pen. Code, §§ 682, 683.) The grant-
ing of a new trial reopens the criminal action for all pur-
poses; upon the new trial (unless trial by jury is waived) 
the discretion of the jury in the selection of the penalty is 
absolute. (People v. Green (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 209, 218 [7], 
229 [302 P.2d 307] ; People v. Friend (1957) 47 Ca1.2d 749, 
764-765 [11] [306 P.2d 463].) 
The consequences of the majority's radical departure . from 
established law and practice should be frankly faced. The 
most immediate of these is that a new category of "automat-
ic" appeals has been carved out by judicial decision, for all 
defendants convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 
life imprisonment will hereafter have everything to gain and 
nothing to lose by prosecuting review of their judgments at 
the public expense no matter how frivolous and insubstantial 
their grounds of appeal may be. Even more serious, however, 
will be the effect of the majority's holding on established 
sentencing practices of our trial courts. Until today it had 
never been thought that when a judgment of conviction was 
reversed at the defendant's behest, the former sentence or 
disposition in any way tied the hands of the trial judge in 
sentencing the defendant on a new judgment of conviction 
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for the same offense rendered upon retrial. Thus when a de-
fendant is convicted of one of the many offenses punishable 
either as a felony or as a misdemeanor (see Pen. Code, § 17) 
and is sentenced as a misdemeanant, the trial judge on a new 
conviction after reversal on appeal may sentenee thc defend-
ant as a felon for the same offense. When a defendant is 
convicted of a misdemeanor and a fine is imposed in lieu of 
confinement in county jail, the trial judge on a new convic-
tion of the same offense after reversal may instead sentence 
the defendant to jailor to both a fine and jail (Pen. Code, 
§ 19; see also § 672). When a defendant is convicted of two 
or more offenses at the same trial and the judgment directs 
that the sentences shall be served concurrently (Pen. Code, 
§ 669), the tria 1 jud~(' 011 new convictions of the same offenses 
after reversal may direct that the same sentences shall be 
served consecutively. And when a convicted defendant is 
granted probation, then appeals and secures a reversal of the 
cause, the trial judge on a new conviction for the same 
offense may deny probation and sentence the defendant to a 
term of imprisonment. 
Each of the foregoing propositions has long been part of 
the settled law and practice of the trial courts of this state. 
Each is now upsct by the majority's holding (ante, p. 497) 
that the prohibition against double jeopardy applies in eases 
where the law" allows the court or jury to fix different pun-
ishments for the same crime." If these practices have not 
been affected by today's decision, it can only be because the 
majority have decided that in California there is to be one 
criminal law for death penalty cases and another criminal 
law for all other cases. Such an unspoken discrimination is 
without rational foundation and would in effect be grossly 
unfair to the vast majority of defendants not on trial for 
their lives-and to the public at large in California who are 
entitled to the firm enforcement of laws enacted for their 
protection. 
The mention of the public at large-the seemingly forgot-
ten law-abiding members of society-brings me to another 
phase of this case, the presentation of which requires some 
augmentation of the facts beyond those indicated by the 
majority. 
In the first place it may be noted that this defendant was 
not in any scnse a victim of overreaching by the trial court 
or the prosecntor. Rather, it appears the defendant-appar-
ently aided by study of the Penal Code and other sources of 
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legal lorc-scllcmrd his way to a new trial. As to his waiver 
of a jury at the first trial, his plea of guilty, his discharge of 
court-appointed counsel, and his procuring of a ne,v trial by 
stipulation, the record shows items and entries as hereinafter 
summarized or quoted . 
. A.fter having been indicted for murder defelldant was pro-
vided with two attorneys; he asked for trial "on the issue of 
present sanity pursuant to section 1368, Penal Code" and 
four eminent psychiatrists were appointed (two designated 
to be "on behalf of the defendant") to "examine said 
defendant as to his present sanity." Trial by jury on this 
issue was waived by both defendant and the district attor-
ney; the reports of the doctors and testimonies of various 
witnesses including the defendant were received, and the 
court (Martin E. Rothenberg, Judge) found that defendant 
was sane and able to cooperate with his counsel. Thereafter 
defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by rea-
son of insanity, and four psychiatrists were appointed "to 
examine ... and determine whether ... defendant was sane at 
the time of the commission of the crime, and render a re-
port ... and to testify as to the mental condition of said de-
fendant .... " 
On January 16, 1962, the time fixed for trial, defendant 
appeared with his attorneys before Judge Hugh H. Donovan, 
waived a jury and consented "that the Court determine his 
gUilt or innocence and if found guilty, the Court to deter-
mine the degree of the offense." Evidence was received, in-
cluding the reports of six doctors, the transcript of the 
Grand Jury proceedings and various photographs. The trial· 
was then ordered continued to Monday, January 22,1962. 
On Thursday, January 18, however, the record shows that 
defendant with his two attorneys, and the district attorney 
and his deputy, appeared and the following minute orders 
were made: 
1. Minutes of Thursday, January 18, 1962, 9 :30 a.m., lIon. 
Hugh H. Donovan, Judge. 
"The defendant with his counsel William Kretzmer and 
Theodore Forurio [sic] and the District Attorney John 
Nejedly and Deputy District Attorney Daniel Boatwright 
appear in open Court at this time, and the Court fixcs this as 
the time for hearing the defendant's motion. 
"Thereupon the defendant moves the Court to discharge 
the Court appointed attorneys and the defendant was duly 
advised of his legal rights to be represented by self-employed 
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attorneys and the Court orders William Kretzmer and Theo-
dore Foruria, heretofore appointed by the Court, discharged 
in tllis case. 
"It is further ordered by the Court that said court ap-
pointed counsel be present at the further trial of this case on 
.January 22, 1962 at 1 :30 o'clock p.m. to assist the defendant 
in any way he may call upon them so to do. [Italics added.] 
"Upon motion of defendant, it is by the Court ordered 
that copies of docttments received into evidence, consisting of 
doctors' reports, testimony at Grand Jury hearing and the 
list of evidence submitted to the Court, be transmitted to 
defendant. 
"The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Shcr-
iff." 
2. Minutes of Monday, January 22, 1962, 9 :15 a.m., Hon. 
Hugh H. Donovan, Judge. 
"The defendant in pro pers and the District Attorney and 
Daniel Boatwright, Deputy District Attorney appear in open 
Court at this time, this being the time fixed by the Court for 
the further trial of this cause. William Kretzmer appears in 
open Court at this time in compliance with the order of the 
Court. [Italics added.] 
"Thereupon the defendant waives further argument in 
this cause and withdraws his pleas heretofore entered and 
now enters a plea of guilty of Violation of Section 187, Cali-
fornia Penal Code as charged in the Indictment. 
"The defendant waives argument as to the degree of the 
charge herein and states that he has no legal cause to show 
why judgment should not be pronounced at this time and no 
sufficient cause being shown or appearing to the Court, the 
Court thereupon renders its judgment; 
"Thereupon the Court fixes the degree of the offense 
charged in the indictment as first degree murder; 
" I t is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the 
said Ronald Kaye Henderson is guilty of the crime of Viola-
tion of Section 187, California Penal Code (Murder, first 
degree) and that he be punished by imprisonment in the 
California State Prison for life. 
"Defendant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff for 
delivery into the custody of the Director of Corrections at 
the California Medical Facility at Vacaville, California. 
"It is further ordered by the Court that the time for fixing 
the fee of counsel William Kretzmer, heretofore, appointed 
by the Court to represent the defendant in this cause, be set 
) 
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for Wednesday, January 31, 1962 at 9 :30 o'clock a.m.1I 
"IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA 
COn,TY - STA'l'E OF CALU'OHNIA 
January 22, 1962 
"Present, Hon. Hugh H. Donovan, Judge 
"THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 
OF CALIFORNIA 
VS 
"RONALD KAYE HENDERSON, 
Defendant 
No. 7605 
Convicted of Violation 
of Section 187, Penal 
Code (Murder) 
"The District Attorney, with the defendant came into 
Court. 'l'!Je (h'felldant was duly informed by the Court of the 
indictment found against him on the 11th day of September 
A.D., 1961, for the crime of Violation of Section 187, Cali-
fornia Penal Code (Murder) j of his arraignment on Septem-
ber 18, 1961 and of the appointment of psychiatrists to make 
an examination and report as to the defendant's sanity; of 
his trial by Court as to the defendant's sanity and the find-
ings of the Court on November 13, 1961 that defendant is 
sane; and of his plea of Not Guilty and Not Guilty by reason 
of insanity; and of his trial by Court on January 16, 1962 
and of his withdrawal of pleas heretofore entered and of his 
plea of 'Guilty of the Offense Charged'; on the 22nd day of 
January 1962 to-wit: Guilty of the crime of Violation of 
Section 187, California Penal Code (Murder) and of the 
Court fixing the degree of the offense on January 22, 1962, to-
wit: Murder in the first degree. 
"The defendant was then asked if he had any legal cause 
to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him 
to which he replies that he had none. And no sufficient cause 
being shown or appearing to the Court, thereupon the Court 
renders its judgment: 
"That whereas the said Ronald Kaye Henderson having 
been duly convicted in this Court of the crime of Violation of 
Section 187, California Penal Code (Murder, first degree). 
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED, That the said Ronald Kaye Henderson is guilty 
of the crime of Violation of Section 187, California Penal 
Code (murder, first degree) and that he be punished by im-
IIThis does not mean that the proeeedings of January 22 were diseon-
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prisonmellt in the STATE PRISON OF CAJJIFOn~TA for 
life and that the Sheriff of Contra Costa County deliver the 
defendant into the custody of the Director of Correction at 
the California Medical Facility at VacaYille, Califol'llia, and 
there dcliver him. 
"The defendant was then remanded to the custody of the 
Sheriff of the County of Contra Costa to bc by llim dclivered 
into the custody of the Director of Corrections at thc Cali-
fornia Medical Facility at Vacaville, California." 
As to Proceedings Relativc to Sccolld Judglllent 
Psychiatric Report of Theo K. Miller, M.D., and Walter 
Rapaport, M.D., dated September 6, 1962: 
"The Honorable Wakefteld Taylor, Judge 
Superior Court 
Contra Costa County 
Martinez, California 
,. Dear Judge Taylor: 
"Pursuant to your order the undersigned Theo K. M; 11er, 
M.D., Superintendent and Medical Dir('ctor of the Napa 
State Hospital, and \Valter Rapaport, M.D., Superilltl'IHh'llt 
and Medical Director of the Agnews State Hospital, exam-
ined the above-named Ronald Kaye Henderson to determine 
l1is mental condition with special reference to llis plea of Not 
Guilty and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity to a chargc of 
violation of Penal Code, Sec. 187 . 
• , Be it remembered that both examiners had seen ~Ir. I1l'n-
derson and examined him on several occasions in Octob('r 
1%1. In addition, one of us, Dr. Rapaport, examined Mr. 
Henderson on December 24, 1961. Reports of these examina-
tions were submitted to The Honorable Martin E. Rothenberg 
on the date of October 30, 1961 and the report of Dr. Rapa-
port under date of December 27, 1961. '" [Defendant] went 
to Vaeavillc on January 23, 1962 and in April was transfer-
red to San Quentin Prison. He states that he was not placed 
on a psychiatric ward as [sic] San Quentin. The defendant 
states that he went to Court prior to going to Vacaville and 
he states that Judge Donovan was the judge. At this time he 
states that he never knew the charges that he was facing. 
When asked about his statement at earlier examinations 
wherein he told the examiners what the charges were, the 
defendant replied, 'If you know anything you can bring it 
up in court.' He states that when he went into Judge Dono-
van's court last year he had decided to fire his attorneys 
) 
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because he did not feel that they were giving him a good 
deft'llse. lIe stat('s that 011 .January 24, th<' day aft('r nrriving 
in Vacaville, he put in a Notice of Appeal and a lawyer was 
appointed to represent him and the appeal was completed on 
the grounds tllat the court had accepted a plea of Guilty at a 
time when the defendant had no lawyer. He states th'lt the 
matter of firing his lawyers and entering a plea of Gltilty 
was his own idea and no one else had advised him. [Italics 
added.J He states the lawyer who wrote the appeal ,vas 
Robert Brilliant but that no,v he has another lawyer who was 
appointed by the court in Martinez. He states that his case is 
set for S<,ptember 18 and that his plea is Not Guilty and Not 
Guilty by Reason of Insanity. He gives the victim's name as 
Joyce l\Iarie Lovett, whom he had met about a year and a 
half before the incident. He states that he is now in jail for 
killing someone but goes on to say that he didn't kill any-
body, that he wouldn't even kill a fly. Asked whether lIe had 
beaten women in the past, he states, 'That is in the past. I am 
talking about the present. There is no actual proof of any-
thing. ' 
"The defendant states that he will answt'r any questions 
except those about the actual homicide. Asked if this means 
tllat he could ans,ver if he wanted to or that he doesn't know 
the answers, the defendant replies that the examiners can 
form their own conclusion, and repeats that he will not an-
swer question [s] or give any information about the homicide. 
He quotes the Penal Code and says, 'You can't walk into 
court and plead guilty unless evidence is introduced to prove 
a crime was committed, and there was no such evidence in-
troduced in my case. I entered a plea of guilty to get a new 
trial. I looked at books in the jail here and took a chance that 
the judge would refuse to aecept my plea of guilty and ap-
point another attorney.' " (Italics added.) 
Proceeding with his scheme to procure a new trial it ap-
pears (from the official record of the proceedings in this 
action in the District Court of Appeal leading to the reversal 
of the first judgment, and in more detail than is related by 
the majority in respect thereto) that defendant under date of. 
JUly 11, 1962, procured a stipulation as follows: 
.. IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the 
parties to the above-entitled action, through tlleir respective 
counsel, that the judgment of conviction entered against the 
appellant on Jan. 22, 1962, by the Superior Court of the 
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may be reversed by this Court and the matter remanded for 
retrial. The basis for this stipulation is that the appellant 
was erroneously allowed to enter a plea of guilty, while un-
represented by counsel, to a felony for which the maximum 
punishment was death. 
"Dated: July 11, 1962 
"STANLEY MOSK, Attorney General 
of the State of California 
"JOHN S. McINERNY 
Deputy Attorney General 
John S. McInerny 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Robert M. Brilliant 
ROBERT M. BRILLIANT 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Ronald Kaye Henderson 
RONALD KAYE HENDERSON 
Petitioner" 
The stipulation was then followed up by letters dated July 
17, 1962, from defendant's then attorney, Robert M. Bril-
liant, and one dated July 18, 1962, from the Attorney Gener-
al which read respectively as follo,vs: 
"Consistent with our telephone conversation of even date 
herewith with John S. McInerny, deputy attorney general, 
and the Clerk in the above-entitled Court, hereiwith [sic] is 
my stipulation, to wit: That the remittitur issue forthwith." 
"Pursuant to the stipulation presently on file with the 
Court and relating to the reversal of this case, the People of 
the State of California hereby consent that the remittitur in 
this case may issue immediately by this Court upon the 
Court's entering the judgment of reversal " 
With such stipulations before it the District Court of Ap-
peal on July 19,1962, entered its order: 
"Pursuant to a stipulation of the appellant and counsel 
for the respective parties, the judgment of conviction entered 
against the appellant on January 22, 1962, by the Superior 
Court of the State of California in and for the County of 
Contra Costa is reversed and the case is remanded for a new 
trial. It is ordered tbat tbe remittitur issue forthwith. " 
Reading of tbe record at the second trial reveals t11at tbe 
evidence then taken was far more extensive and conclusive 
J 
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than that received at the first trial. The evidence now before 
us is overwhelming not only that defendant perpetrated the 
atrocities and killed his victim but also that he did so inten-
tionally, designedly, intelligently, because he enjoyed doing 
it, and bccause he had learned from having failed to kill at 
least one woman (whom he had tortured to some extent as he 
tortured his victim here) that despite her promises not to tell 
on him if he would let her live, she did eventually tell. In-
deed, it develops she could not well have concealed what he 
had done because of the condition in which he left her. More 
particularly as to the- case at bench the evidence establishes 
that defendant weighed something over 200 pounds; his vie-
tim weighed 100 pounds. The cruelties he perpetrated on her 
before strangling her are too revolting to unnecessarily 
detail, but some quotations from the transcript must be in-
corporated. 
Indicative of the crafty legal acumen of this defendant is 
the fact that he testified that the atrocious mutilations of the 
deceased occurred after he had killed her by strangulation. 
Thus he would avoid a finding of murder in the first degree, 
which is required by statute (Pen. Code, § 189) where thc 
proof shows that the killing was "perpetrated by means of 
. " torture." Likewise this man said he could not recall 
when or how he received the long scratches on his face (and 
did not explain his" black eye") although the evidence was 
unequivocal that he was "cold sober" shortly after receiving 
them and at the time he was arranging to get his car in order 
to dispose of the victim's body. He could not remember 
things that were difficult to explain in any such way as 
would absolve him from guilt but he testified that before 
killing his victim he did not hit or cut her or do any other 
violence to her body. He conveniently" passed out" or went 
to sleep and he "woke" or "came out" only after the vio-
lent acts had been committed. This man by his trick on the 
trial court-perhaps on the Attorney General-has secured 
one new trial and seems about to cheat justice again. He 
"Got a lot of pain and it made him black out like, and when 
he came to, he had a can opener in his hand and ... he looked 
at her and he realized he strangled Iter and cut Iter up from 
the bottom part with the can opener to the belly button .•.. 
He said that he went into the bathroom and strangled her 
and then he .... He just cut her up .... That he woke up 
and he found the can opener in his hand." Is it not signifi-
cant to even a reviewing court that he reiterates that he 
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strangled her first and only then cut her up' Manifestly this 
testimony was significant to the jury and the trial judge. 
The record at the second trial reveals evidcnce pertinent to 
both guilt and penalty which was not produced at the first 
trial. It was not received at the first trial because defendant 
at that trial avoided it by pleading gUilty. One new witness 
at the second trial had been picked up by defendant at the 
same bar at which about one month later he picked up the 
victim in the case at bench. The witness related defendant's 
following her from the bat", offering to give her a ride home, 
her acceptance, her developing apprehension and attempt to 
leave the car, his beating her, wounding her in the head, and 
forcing her to disrobe and engage in unnatural acts. Then 
"He got some kind of thing . .. and put it up in me ... he 
rammed it up in me in my privates ... and he also had his 
finger up my rectum .... " Each of these things, it appears 
he also did to the victim he killed in the case at bench. 
The transcript proceeds" ... he grabbed me by the llair ... 
and beat my head down against the seat and said ... 'I think 
I'll kill you now because, after all I did to you and after 
what you did to me, , he said, 'I still didn't come' .... 
"He says' I 'm going to bite you up all over your body and 
I'm going to cut you wide open because I always wanted to 
see what a woman looked like inside,' I said, 'Please don't 
. . .. Don't kill me .. .' He said, 'It wouldn't do you any 
good if you get killed.' I said, 'You'll die too,' and he said 
'I don't care, when I go into these moods, what happens to 
me.' ... 
"He ... bit me on my right leg and my privates and my 
right side and bit me up on my breasts and my arms." 
(Five color photographs graphically corroborating the wit-
ness's testimony were received in evidence.) 
Relevant indeed to the case at bench the witness contin-
ued: "I said, 'Just let me get out of this car. I don't care, 
any way, without any clothes, anything, just let me go. I 
won't turn you in or anything .... 
"And he says, 'No, I'm afraid to let you. I'm afraid 
you'll tell on me like the rest of the girls I have done.'" 
However, although he kept her "pants, bra, slip, purse, and a 
little jacket that went with the dress" she had on, he did let 
her go. 
She "ran to a house and started ringing the doorbell," 
was admitted, the police were called and she went to the San 
Jose County Hospital. About two weeks later she received a 
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telephone can from dcfendant, and he said, "Oh, yes. You 
turned me in, didn't you f Now I'm going to get you. I'll 
get you one way or the other. I'm going to kill you." She 
reported that call to the police. That incident meant to 
defendant that he would not be so indulgent as to let his next 
victim live to tell her story. This record shows he kept that 
resolution. 
After studying the record it is impossible for me to con-
clude that the defendant has been denied any element of a 
fair trial or due process, or that there has been a miscarriage 
of justice by the conviction and sentence of the appellant. In 
particular, although many instructions were necessarily 
given to the jury to cover the multiple aspects of the case, the 
charge (taken as a whole of course) is commendably compre-
hensive and free from error. The learned trial judge was 
especially careful in defining the degrees of murder and the 
necessity for proof of specific intent, reached by deliberation 
and premeditation, as a basis for first degree murder. Among 
other elements the judge emphasized that "To constitute thi:.: 
kind and degree of homicide the killing must be accompanied 
by a clear, deliberate intent to take life. The intent to kill 
must be the result of deliberation and must have been formed 
upon a pre-existing reflection and not under a heat of passion 
or other condition such as precludes the idea of deliberation . 
. .. To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the 
slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and 
the reasons for and against such choice, and, having in mind 
the consequences, decide to and commit the unlawful act 
causing death." 
I would affirm the jUdgment. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Respondcnt's petition for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 18, 1963. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
